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abstract  : The aim of this paper is to show to what extent Descartes 
can be situated within the Augustinian metaphysical tradition and to 
what extent he has departed from it. To this end, we will argue that Des-
cartes has borrowed his main Meditations’ arguments from Augustine’s 
philosophy. However, in spite of all factual and textual evidence we will 
provide against the originality of Descartes’ metaphysical discussions, 
it will be stressed, on the other hand, that in borrowing not only the 
cogito argument, but also some general features of his philosophy from 
Augustine’s works, Descartes intends to frame a metaphysics which will 
be the ground on his new mechanistic physics. Having this in mind, 
we will hold that no claim can be put forward against the originality 
and far-reaching scope of Descartes’ philosophical intentions. Indeed, 
Descartes’ purpose is to build a new science under a metaphysics, even 
though this metaphysics is the Augustianian one.
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Descartes’ relationship with the thought of Augustine or with 
the Augustinian tradition is problematic. Although Descartes asserts that 
he refuses to follow any philosophical tradition because, he tells us, “[...] 
since my earliest youth I have accepted many falses opinions as true 
ones” (descartes, 1996, at 7 [Meditations], p. 17 )1, he nonetheless seems 
to have employed some philosophical theses already found in the work 
of the bishop of Hippo. In fact, according to Menn, “[...] Descartes’ 
philosophy  bears many resemblances to the thought of Augustine […]” 
(menn, 1998, p. 4); but rather more important than this is the fact that, 
“[…] Descartes did intend to build his new philosophy (including his 
physics) on the old Augustinian metaphysics […]” (menn, 1998, p. 16).
To bring to light the resemblances of Descartes’s thought to that 
of Augustine is the first goal of this paper. Arguably, as we will see, on 
the basis of  these resemblances we could call Descartes an Augustinian 
author, as we do in the case of Arnauld and Malebranche, for instance. 
Next, we will show what Descartes aims at when walking along the 
Augustinian metaphysical path. It will become manifest, with the claim 
that Descartes establishes his new mechanistic physics on a metaphysics 
of Augustinian inspiration, that Descartes is part of a deeper and wider 
philosophical project in Early Modern Philosophy.
In the message attached to the text of the Meditations, Descartes 
says to the Theologians of the Faculty of Paris that his metaphysics is 
grounded on the demonstration of God’s and of the human soul’s ex-
istence: “I have always considered that the questions concerning God 
and the soul were the main among those which are to be demonstrated 
1  “[…]  multa, ineuente aetate, falsa pro veris admiserim […]”. ‘at’ refers to Oeuvres 
de Descartes, 11 volumes, (Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, eds) Paris: J. Vrin 1996.
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by philosophical rather by theological argument” (descartes, 1996, at 
7[Meditations], p. 1)2. Augustine has also attached great importance on 
the same two issues. As a philosopher and a clergyman, he emphasizes 
the priority of these topics on his theoretical researches: “I desire to 
know God and the soul” (augustine, Soliloquia, i, 7)3, he says. With this 
being stated, we may reasonably argue that the convergence of Des-
cartes’ and Augustine’s purposes lies in the fact that both philosophers 
employ the ‘method of introspection’. The ‘method of introspection’ 
consists in putting empirical-corporeal considerations aside and in con-
centrating on the analysis of the ‘inner man’, that is to say, of the human 
soul. In Augustine’s words: “Do not go abroad. Return within itself. In 
the inward man dwells truth” (augustine, De vera religione, xxxix, 72)4. 
Descartes has, in turn, adopted a similar approach to address the philo-
sophical problems which he was going to deal with, as suggested by the 
title of his masterpiece: Meditations on First Philosophy. After being used 
in the first two Meditations, the ‘method of introspection’ is also evoked 
at the beginning of the Third meditation: “talking just to myself and con-
sidering more deeply my own nature, I shall try little by little to reach 
a better knowledge of and a more familiarity with myself ” (descartes, 
1996, at 7 [Meditations], p. 34).5
Yet if these evidences are not enough to demonstrate the real 
ties of Descartes with the Augustinian philosophy, there is still a great 
2  “Semper existimavi duas quaestiones, de Deo et de Anima, praecipuas esse ex iis 
quae Philosophiae, quam Theologiae ope sunt demonstrandae”. 
3 “Deum et animam scire cupio”.
4  “Noli foras ire, in teipsum redi; in interiore homine veritas habitat”.
5  “[...] meque solum alloquendo et penitius inspiciendo, meipsum paulatim mihi 
magis notum et familiarem reddere conabor”. 
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amount of other arguments displayed in the Meditations that bears an 
undeniable resemblance, beyond the aforementioned metaphysical and 
methodological similarities, with those arguments discussed by the 
Bishop of Hippo many centuries before. In fact, we have already shown 
that, in Augustine’s work, the act of doubting is a previous condition 
for reaching any certainty. In his work On true relligion, Augustine asserts 
that “everyone who knows that he has doubts knows with certainty 
something that is true; he is certain about this truth [that he has doubts]. 
Hence, everyone who doubts whether there is such thing as the truth 
has a truth about which he cannot doubt” (augustine, De vera religi-
one, xxxix, 73)6. The postulate that the ‘natural light’ provided by God 
allows us to reach the truth is also present in Augustine’s epistemology: 
“[...] imbued in some way and illumined by him [God] with intelligible 
light, [the rational soul] discerns, not with physical eyes, but with its 
own highest part in which lies its excellence, i.e., with its intelligence, 
those reasons [...]” (augustine, De Diversis Quaestionibus Octoginta Tribus, 
q. 46, 2)7. Augustine had also struggled to refute the sceptical argu-
ments concerning the dream, the madness, and the denial of the senses 
as a trustworthy source of knowledge, as we can see in the long quote 
below:
You will ask me, “Is what you see the world even if you are as-
leep?”. It has already been said that I call ‘world’ whatever seems 
6  “[O]mnis qui se dubitantem intelligit, verum intelligit, et de hac re quam intelligit 
certus est: de vero igitur certus est. Omnis ergo qui utrum sit veritas dubitat, in seipso 
habet verum unde non dubitet”. 
7  “[...] ab eo lumine illo intellligibili perfusa quodammodo et illustrata  cernit non 
per corporeos oculos, sed per ipsius sui principile quo excellit, id est, per intelligentiam 
suam, istas rationes [...]”.
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to me to be such. But if it pleases him [the Academician] to call 
‘world’ only what seems so to those who are awake or to those 
who are sane, then maintain this if you can: that those who are 
asleep or insane are not asleep or insane in the world. For this 
reason, I state that this whole mass of bodies in which we exist 
– whether we be asleep, insane, awake, or sane, or asleep – either 
is one or is not one. Explain how this view can be false. Now if 
I am asleep, it might be that I had said nothing; or if the words 
scape from my mouth while I am asleep, as it sometimes happens, 
it might be that I did not say them here, sitting as I am, to this 
audience. Yet the claim itself cannot be false. Nor do I say that I 
have perceived this because I am awake. You can say that this also 
could seem so to me while I was asleep, and thus it can be very 
like what is false. If, however, there is one world and six worlds, 
then, whatever condition I may be in, it is clear there is seven 
worlds, and it is not presumptuous of me to affirm that I know 
this. Accordingly, prove that either this inference or those disjunc-
tions given above can be false because of sleep, madness, or the 
unreliability of the senses. If I remember them when I awake up, 
I will admit that I have been beaten. I think it is now sufficiently 
clear what falsehoods seem to be so through sleep and madness, 
namely, those that pertain to the bodily senses (augustine, Contra 
academicos, iii, 11, 25)8.
8  “Etiamne, inquies, si dormis, mundus est iste quem vides? Iam dictum est, 
quidquid tale mihi videtur, mundum appello. Sed si eum solum placet mundum 
vocare, qui videtur a vigilantibus vel etiam a sanis; illud contende, si potes, eos qui 
dormiunt ac furiunt, non in mundo furere atque dormire. Quamobrem hoc dico, 
istam totam corporum molem atque machinam in qua sumus, sive dormientes, sive 
furentes, sive vigilantes, sive sani, aut unam esse, aut non esse unam. Edissere, quomodo 
possit ista esse falsa sententia.  Si autem unus et sex mundi sunt; septem mundos esse, 
quoquo modo affectus sim, manifestum est, et id me scire non impudenter affirmo. 
Quare vel hanc connexionem, vel illas superius disiunctiones doce somno aut furore 
aut vanitate sensuum posse esse falsas. Si enim dormio, fieri potest ut nihil dixerim; 
aut si etiam ore dormientis verba, ut solet, evaserunt, potest fieri ut non hic, non ita 
sedens, non istis audientibus dixerim: ut autem hoc falsum sit, non potest. Nec ego 
illud me percepisse dico, quod vigilem. Potes enim dicere, hoc mihi etiam dormienti 
videri potuisse; ideoque hoc potest esse falso simillimum. ; et me, si expergefactus ista 
meminero, victum esse concedam. Credo enim iam satis liquere quae per somnium et 
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In the same way, if we take a careful look at the Meditations, 
we will see that both the problems and the discussions put forward 
by Descartes and Augustine are very close to one another. In fact, like 
Augustine, Descartes fights against the sceptical doctrine. For this rea-
son, he applies his ‘method of doubt’ to the most traditional arguments 
delivered by the sceptics. So he will challenge the sceptical argument 
about the fallibility of the senses – “All that up to the present time I 
have admitted as the most true and certain I have learned either from 
the senses or through the senses; but it is proved to me that these senses 
are sometimes deceptive, and it is wise not to trust entirely in those by 
which we have once been deceived9” (descartes, 1996, at 7 [Medita-
tions], p.18.)10, the argument about the dreaming illusions – “How often 
actually has it happened to me that in the night I dreamt that I found 
myself in this particular place, that I was dressed and seated near the 
fire, while in reality I was lying in the bed undressed” (descartes, 1996, 
at 7 [Meditations], p. 20.)11, so that, he concludes, “[...] I realize that 
dementiam falsa videantur, ea scilicet quae ad corporis sensus pertinent”.
9  Although it is not our subject here, we agree with Gilson’s claim that the  First 
meditation is aimed at being a critique to the scholastic empiricism. Descartes himself 
hints this interpretation in the synopsis of the Meditations, when he says about his 
‘method of doubt’ that “[...] the utility of a doubt that is so general does not appear 
at first; it is nonetheless very great, inasmuch as it delivers us from all prejudices [got-
ten through or by the senses] and set out for the mind a way by which it can detach 
itself from the senses” – “[...] tantae dubitationis utilitas prima fronte non appareat, 
est tamen in eo maxima quod ab omnibus praejudiciis nos liberet viamque facillimam 
sternat  ad mentem ab sensibus abducendam” (descartes, 1996, at 7 [Meditations], p. 
12). For more details on this issue, see gilson, 1951, pp. 184-190.
10  “Nempe quidquid hactenus ut maxime verum admisi, vel a sensibus, vel per 
sensus accepi; hos autem interdum fallere deprehendi, ac prudentiae est nunquam illis 
confidere qui nos vel semel deceperunt”. 
11  “Quam frequenter vero usitata ista, me hic esse, toga vestiri, foco assidere, quies 
noturna persuadet, cum tamen positis vestibus jaceo inter strata!”. 
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there is never any reliable way of distinguishing being awake from being 
asleep” (descartes, 1996, at 7 [Meditations], p. 19.)12, and the argument 
about madness – “How could I deny that these hands and this body are 
mine? Maybe I would compare myself to certain people denied of sens-
es, whose cerebella are so troubled by the violents vapours of black bile 
[...]” (descartes, 1996, at 7 [Meditations], pp. 18-19)13. Furthermore, the 
‘natural light’ also plays a fundamental role in Descartes’ epistemology: 
“[...] whatever  the natural light shows me to be true by no means can 
be doubted14” (descartes, 1996, at 7 [Meditations], p. 38)15.
Among all those elements which could be mentioned in or-
der to demonstrate the similarities between Descartes’ and Augustine’s 
argumentation, the one that has mostly impressed his contemporaries 
was the ‘je pense, donc je suis’. Mersenne, after his reading of the Discourse 
on Method (1637), that is to say, before the Meditations (1641) had been 
published, call the attention of Descartes as to the striking resemblance 
of his so-called ‘cogito argument’ with the famous Augustinian thesis ‘si 
enim fallor, sum’16. Afterwards, having the Meditations been printed, it is 
the time of Arnauld, a follower of Augustine, to tell Descartes that “the 
12  “[...] video nunquam certis indiciis vigiliam a somno posse distingui [...]”.
13  “Manus vero has ipsas, totumque hoc corpus meum esse, qua ratione posset negari? 
Nisi me forte comparem nescio quibus insanis, quorum cerebella tam contumax vapor 
ex atra bile labefactat [...]”.
14  For instance, the important truth that God is not a deceiver comes from the 
‘natural light’:“the natural light teaches us that all fraud and deception necessarily 
proceed from some defect” – “Omnem enim fraudem et deceptionem a defectu aliquo 
pendere, lumine naturali manifestum est” (descartes, 1996, at 7 [Meditations], p. 52). 
God, we know, is a ens perfectissimum.
15  “[...] quaecumque lumine naturali mihi ostenduntur [...] nullo modo dubia esse 
possunt [...]”.
16  See descartes, 1996, at 1 [letter to Mersenne], p. 376
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first thing that I find remarkable is that this notable man [Descartes] has 
based his whole philosophy on a principle that was laid down by  saint 
Augustine, a man of great intelligence” (descartes, 1996, at 7 [Medita-
tions], p. 197)17. While in this passage Arnauld is obviously referring to 
the cogito argument, Mersenne has in mind a quotation from Augustine’s 
De civitate Dei –
What if you are deceived? If I am deceived, I am. For he who is 
not cannot be deceived; and for this very reason I am, if I am de-
ceived. And since I am if I am deceived, how can I be deceived in 
thinking that I am? It is certain that I am if I am deceived. Since, 
therefore, I should be, even if I were deceived, for sure I am not 
deceived by the fact that I have known myself. Consequently, I 
am not deceived in knowing that I know it (augustine, De civitate 
Dei, xi, 26)18 –,
Arnauld is comparing Descartes’ cogito argument with another passage 
from Augustine, found in the De libero arbitrio: “To get started with what 
is clearest, I ask first whether you yourself exist. Are you perhaps afraid 
that you might be deceived by this question? In fact, if you did not exist, 
you could not be deceived at all” (augustine, De libero arbitrio, ii, 3)19.
 
17  “[H]ic primum mirari  subit, Virum Clarissimum idem pro totius suae philosophiae 
principio statuisse, quod statuit D. Augustinus, acerrimi vir ingenii […]”. 
18  “Quid si falleris? Si enim fallor, sum. Nam qui non est, utique nec falli potest; ac 
per hoc sum, si fallor. Quia ergo sum si fallor, quomodo esse me fallor, quando certum 
est me esse, si fallor? Quia igitur essem qui fallerer, etiamsi fallerer, procul dubio in eo, 
quod me novi esse, non fallor. Consequens est autem, ut etiam in eo, quod me novi 
nosse, non fallar”.
19  “[...] Prius abs te quaero, ut de manifestissimis capiamus exordium; utrum tu ipse 
sis. An fortasse tu metuis, ne in hac interrogatione fallaris, cum utique si non esses, falli 
omnino non posses?”.
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 Thus, from Arnauld’s comment on, it has begun the long history 
of the affirmation that Descartes had ‘borrowed’ the cogito argument 
from Augustine, and, for this reason, he would be in some sense taking 
back the philosophy of the Bishop of Hippo. In truth, all the essential 
questions about the striking and undeniable resemblances between the 
cogito, ergo sum and the si enim fallor, sum have already been raised by 
Descartes’ contemporaries. The recognition of this fact has allowed Eti-
enne Gilson to state that “though other texts of secondary importance 
have been taken into consideration since that time, nothing has been 
added to the facts already known” (gilson, 1951, p. 191.)20.
As demonstrated above, the comparison of some works of Au-
gustine with the Meditations of Descartes does make clear the existence 
of a strong similarity in the arguments of both authors, as well as an 
almost literal repetition by the French philosopher of certain expres-
sions found in the thought of the Bishop of Hippo, more so in the 
construction of the cogito argument. Based on this compelling evidence, 
someone who wanted not only to situate Descartes within the Augus-
tinian tradition, but also to deny the role traditionally attributed to him 
as ‘the founder of the modern philosophy’ would have an easy task to 
carry out. From this point of view, Descartes would be a mere epigone 
of Augustine, given that he would only be repeating what his ‘master’ 
had already taught.
However convincing this interpretation of the relationship be-
tween Descartes and Augustine might be, there is arguably something 
very wrong with it. Although the Meditations is considered as the main 
20  “[B]ien que d’autres textes d’importance secondaire aient été pris en considération 
depuis cette époque, on n’a rien ajouté d’essentiel aux faits dejà connus”.
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philosophical work of Descartes and the cogito argument is viewed as his 
most important metaphysical thesis, they constitute neither the whole 
of the Cartesian new system of thought, nor they stand for the true and 
deep contribution Descartes believed he was making to the European 
culture, still dominated by the Scholastic teaching. In what follows, we 
will show the reason why Descartes ‘borrowed’ the Augustinian meta-
physics and what motivations led him to do it.
To begin with, as a matter of fact, there is no proof whatsoever 
that Descartes really read any of Augustine’s works. For this reason, the 
debate about whether Descartes read Augustine tends to produce no 
definite conclusion, but only hypotheses and speculation. Neverthe-
less, Menn draws attention to the frequently ignored fact that “[...] in 
France there was no rival to Augustine’s prestige. He was an ineffaceable 
part of the intelectual background against which thinkers of the seven-
teenth-century defined themselves21” (menn, 1998, p. 6). Descartes, for 
instance, had contact with Cardinal Bérulle, the founder and leader of 
the Oratorians in France, who was thoroughly imbued with Augustine’s 
thought. This fact happened before Descartes had worked out his meta-
physics and might have concretely helped him to shape his project of 
creating a new philosophy. On the basis of these circumstances, Menn 
goes further and asserts that Descartes really knew and maybe have 
read some of Augustine’s works. However, he also admits that it is not 
possible to say exactly whether “[…] his [Descartes’] reading was deep 
or extensive [...]” (menn, 1998, p. ix.). This fact does not prevent Menn 
21  Signs of the influence of Augustine upon the French culture in the Seventeenth 
Century can be notoriously found in thinkers like Arnauld and Malebranche, followers 
of both Augustine and Descartes.
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from laying down the most important thesis of his book, which is: “[...] 
the entire metaphysics of the Meditations is the result of this process of 
adaptation of Augustinian metaphysics [...]” (menn, 1998, p. 16.).
In his eagerness to assert the connection between Descartes’ 
metaphysics and that of Augustine, Menn seems to suggest what has 
really come about. For the word ‘adaptation’ means neither merely ‘re-
peating’ nor just ‘copying’. The process of ‘adaptation’ of Augustine’s 
metaphysics is carried out by Descartes to suit what we can call the 
‘instrumentalization’ of the Augustinian thought. In fact, only through 
a process of adaptation would Descartes be able to make that old meta-
physics of the Bishop of Hippo work on behalf of his new project of 
building a system of mechanistic sciences. To reach this goal, Descartes 
should get rid of the intrinsic theological content of the Augustinian 
metaphysics22. Bearing this in mind, we can say that, as an ‘Augustinian’, 
Descartes should undoubtedly ‘adapt’ the Augustine’s metaphysics, since 
its simple copy or repetition would be meaningless and ineffective for 
Descartes’s ambitions to construct a new scientific view of the world 
grounded on a metaphysics23.
The capital role played by the metaphysics of Augustine in shap-
ing the mature philosophy of Descartes seems to come to light if we 
compare the Regulae ad directionem ingenii (1628), which we will desig-
nate as a ‘pre-Augustinian’ work, with a ‘post-Augustinian’ one, like the 
Meditations (1641). In chapter XII of the Regulae, Descartes discusses the 
conception of what he calls ‘simple nature’ (natura simplicissima; res sim-
22  For Arnauld and Malebranche, the theological content of the philosophy of 
Augustine was not a problem at all. 
23  The issue of the scientific purpose of the cogito argument is addressed just below.
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plex)24. He divides them under three headings: intellectual, material, and 
common simple natures. Although, as holds Marion25, these concepts 
give some idea of what the mature metaphysics of Descartes will look 
like, they would never work as a metaphysical condition by themselves. 
To become metaphysical entities they would need a previous metaphys-
ical doctrine, which would unify them and subordinate each one to a 
real substance. Taking Marion’s own examples, one substance would be 
responsible for unifying one intellectual simple nature, like cogitare (to 
think) or dubitare (to doubt), with a common simple nature, like existere 
(to exist), and the result would be the notion of res cogitans. Since the res 
cogitans is a substance, all the intellectual simple natures would be sub-
ordinated to it. The same is true of the material simple natures, which 
would be unified with and subordinated to another substance, the res 
extensa. Thus, under a metaphysical background, the doctrine of sim-
ple natures undergoes a great deal of simplification and cohesion. This 
synthesis of the wide range of simple natures under ontological, more 
fundamental principles is not due, as Marion supposes, to just ‘ordering’ 
them26. In fact, ordering could by no means change the epistemological 
notions of simple natures into the ontological conceptions of substance, 
as the res cogitans and res extensa are thought to be. 
In opposition to Marion’s theses, we believe that the true cause 
lying behind the transformation of the doctrine of simple natures into 
24  See marion, 1992, pp. 115-139. 
25  “With the doctrine of the simple natures, the Regulae is already equipped with 
all the elements required for articulating the first proposition of metaphysics [i.e., the 
cogito argument]” (marion, 1992, p. 119).
26  “What is missing is simply the capacity to establish a necessary order between the 
simple natures to make up the Cogito” (marion, 1992, p. 119).
William de Jesus Teixeira   p. 291 - 313      303
the mature metaphysics of Descartes should be assigned to his assimi-
lation of the philosophy of Augustine, probably from his contact with 
the Oratorians and the Cardinal Bérulle27, as pointed out above. The 
‘method of introspection’ was the principal tool Descartes borrowed 
from Augustine’s thought. All the other striking resemblances between 
their philosophies can be rightly conceived of as a consequence of the 
application of the ‘method of introspection’ to solve philosophical prob-
lems, like those delivered by the sceptics. So before leaving France and 
arriving at Holland, Descartes already knew how to achieve his project 
of working out a new philosophy.
 Descartes was many times warned by his readers about the sim-
ilarity between his cogito argument and Augustine’s si enim fallor, sum. 
For his part, he never denied categorically his acquaintance with the 
texts of the Bishop of Hippo. His most commom reaction towards these 
comments was always to emphasize that the purpose and aim of his 
cogito was thoroughly different from Augustine’s 28. We already find this 
attitude of Descartes in his response to Mersenne’s early observation on 
this issue, after his reading of the Discourse on Method (1637): “[...] Saint 
27  Theses contacts took place after Descartes had worked out his Regulae and before 
the letter sent to Mersenne of April 15, 1630, in which the importance of metaphysics 
to his physics is for the first time spoken out.
28  There are at least two reasons that explain why Descartes did not admit his ties 
with the philosophy of Augustine. First, we can say that, as an author who had a ‘foun-
dationalist’ project and, for this reason, wanted to settle a new beginning in philosophy, 
the idea of relating his philosophy to that of other philosophers would not be suitable 
for his purpose. Secondly, but not lesser important, it is the fact that the admission 
of his proximity to Augustine could get Descartes into trouble with the Aristotelian 
official authorities. Descartes’s reaction to Galileo’s condemnation shows pretty well 
his anxiety over the disapproval of his works by the Church (that is why he sent a 
preliminary version of the Meditations to the theologians of the Faculty of Paris).
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Augustine [...] does not seem to use it [the cogito argument] for the same 
use that I make” (descartes, 1996, at 1 [letter to Mersenne], p. 376)29. In 
another occasion, Descartes not only repeat what he had already said to 
Mersenne about the essential difference of use between both arguments, 
but also explains what that distinction consists in: 
You have warned me of the passage of St. Augustine to which my 
“I think, therefore I am” has some relation. I have read it today in 
the library of this city [Leiden], and I find that he makes use of it 
to prove the certainty of our being, and then to show that there 
is within us an image of the Trinity [...], whereas I make use of it 
to demonstrate that this self, which thinks, is an immaterial subs-
tance, having nothing of material, which are two very different 
things (descartes, 1996, at 3 [anonymous letter], pp. 247-8.)30.
This passage makes clear that, for Descartes, the parallel between the 
two arguments is not meaningful, because, although the utterances are 
very similar to one another, the meaning assigned to them by each au-
thor is quite distinct. In other words, this can be expressed by saying that 
the external resemblance of their ‘formula’ conceals intended thoughts 
that are, in each case, essentially different. 
Whatever one might say, it is undeniable that Descartes – even 
though he does not admit it openly – has borrowed some fundamen-
tal theses from Augustine. For both of them, scepticism has its roots 
29  “[...] Saint Augustin [...] ne me semble s’en  servir à même usage que je fais”.
30  “Vous m’avez obligé de m’avertir du passage de saint Augustin, auquel mon je 
pense, donc je suis, a quelque rapport; je l’ai lu aujourd’hui en la bibliotèque de cette 
ville [Leide], et je trouve véritablement qu’il s’en sert pour prouver la certitude de 
nôtre être, et ensuite pour faire voir qu’il y a en nous quelque image de la Trinité [...]. 
Au lieu que je m’en sers pour faire connaître que ce moi, qui pense, est une substance 
immatérielle, et qui n’a rien de corporel; qui sont deux choses fort différentes”.
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in sensory experience and the solution to solve this problem lies in 
introspection. It is through introspection that one can demonstrate the 
immateriality of the human soul and prove the existence of God. For 
this reason, we cannot speak of the je pense, donc je suis as an original 
argument created by Descartes; nor can we speak of Descartes as the 
first philosopher to conceive of the method of introspection or of pure 
thought as a useful device to overcome the sceptical doctrine. Conse-
quently, we also cannot consider Descartes as the first to establish the 
distinction between mind and body31.
 On the other hand, Descartes seems to be quite right when 
calling our attention to the fact that Augustine’s metaphysical argument 
and his own do not have the same purposes. As Gilson puts it, “[...] 
under no circumstances can one expect to find in St. Augustine the je 
pense as the foundation of a mechanistic physics of the Cartesian type” 
(gilson, 1998, p. 194.)32. Menn, who agrees with Gilson, reinforces Des-
cartes’ point: “the aim of the Meditations is to show that God and the 
soul are better known than bodies; but this demonstration has not only 
the religious and moral utility that Descartes stresses to the doctors of 
Sorbonne, but also a scientific utility” (menn, 1998, p. 57.). The ‘scientific 
utility’ of the Meditations that Menn is talking about comes from the 
fact that it is also the foundation of the Cartesian mechanistic physics33. 
31  See gilson, 1951, p. 198.
32  “[…] en aucun cas on ne peut s’attendre à retrouver chez saint Augustin le je 
pense comme fondement d’une physique mécaniste de type cartésien”.
33  The first appearance of this theme dates from a letter Descartes sent to Mersenne 
on 04/15/1630 (descartes, 1996, AT 1, p. 144). In our understanding, this letter is 
extremely important, insofar as it indicates a turning-point in Descartes’ philosophy: 
“[...] To try to know him [God] and to know oneself. It is through this that I have 
endeavored to begin my studies, and I will tell you that I would not have known how 
to find the foundations of physics if I had not sought them by this means “ – “[...] 
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That is why we give reason to Descartes when he stresses the fact that 
he and Augustine have a distinct aim when putting forward the cogito 
argument. We can find further evidence for this difference of purpose 
in a passage on a letter that Descartes sent to Mersenne, in which he 
asserts the ‘scientific utility’ of his Meditations as well as its anti-scholastic 
content:
[...] I will tell you, among us, that these six Meditations contain 
all the foundations of my Physics. Nevertheless, it should not be 
said, if you please; for those who favor Aristotle would be more 
difficult to approve of them; and I hope that those who read them 
will unconsciously acquiesce in my principles, and will recognize 
their truth before they perceive that they destroy those of Aris-
totle (descartes, 1996, at 3 [letter to Mersenne], p. 297-8)34 35.
 Even though Descartes’ mature philosophy has metaphysical 
Tâcher à le [Dieu] connaître et à connaître soi-même. C’est par là que j’ai tâche de 
commencer mês études, et je vous dirai que j’eusse su trouver les fondements de la 
Physique, si je ne les eusse cherchés par cette voie”. At this moment, Descartes came 
to realize that he could ‘instrumentalize’ Augustine’s thought in order to build a new 
philosophy, and construct a new mechanistic science based on the old metaphysics of 
the African philosopher. Thus, the ‘pre-Augustinian’ system of the Regulae is abandoned 
and we see the new and mature, ‘post-Augustinian’ thinking of Descartes emerging.  
34  “[...] Je vous dirai, entre nous, qui ces six Méditations contiennent tous les 
fondements de ma Physique. Mais il ne le faut pas dire, s’il vous plaît; car ceux qui 
favorisent Aristote feraient peu-être plus de difficulté de les approuver; et j’espère que 
ceux qui les liront, s’accoûtumeront insensiblement à mes principes, et en reconnaîtront 
la verité avant que de s’appercevoir qu’ils détruisent ceux d’Aristote”. 
35  A remarkable feature of Descartes’ philosophical attitude consists in never 
criticizing directly his opponents, above all the scholastics. Unlike Arnauld, Descartes 
has little interest in polemics and controversies. This particularity of the Cartesian 
modus operandi requires that the scholar must be always alert, if he really wants to grasp 
Descartes’ often hidden intentions.
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roots in the thought of the bishop of Hippo, there are more facts that 
should be mentioned in order to help us to understand to what extent 
Descartes’s project can be seen as autonomous in relation to that of 
Augustine. Descartes spent the first nine months of his stay in the Neth-
erlands deepening his knowledge of metaphysical issues. As he tells us, 
“[...] this is the subject I have studied most of all [...]” (descartes, 1996, 
at 1 [letter to Mersenne], p. 144)36. Needless to say, metaphysics plays a 
prominent role in Descartes’ philosophical system, otherwise he would 
not have written a book which has metaphysics as its main subject. 
Nonetheless, Descartes actually considers metaphysics as a kind of ‘pro-
paedeutic discipline’ for science. In this sense, metaphysics is understood 
as a prior learning, a necessary basis to enable one to carry out scientific 
research. For this reason, he believes that as soon as one has grasped the 
meaning of the metaphysical speculations, one can stop studying it and 
finally begin studying what does matter: science. This is exactly what he 
says to the Bohemian princess, Elizabeth:
Finally, as I believe that it is necessary to have understood the 
principles of Metaphysics once in his life, because they are the 
ones who give us the knowledge of God and of our soul, I also 
believe that it would be very detrimental to occupy too fre-
quently his understanding with meditating on them, because it 
could not so well be employed in the functions of the imagi-
nation and the senses; rather, it is better to content himself with 
retaining in his memory and in his belief the conclusions which 
have been drawn from them, and then to employ the rest of the 
time for study in the thoughts in which the understanding acts 
with the imagination and the senses (descartes, 1996, at 3 [letter 
to Elizabeth] p. 695)37.
36  “[...] c’est la matière que j’ai le plus etudiée de toutes [...]”.
37  “Enfin, comme je crois qu’il est nécessaire d’avoir bien compris, une fois en sa 
vie, les principes de la Metaphysique à cause de que ce sont eux qui nous donnent la 
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Turning upside down the most common interpretation of his philoso-
phy, which tends to emphasize its metaphysical theses, focusing above 
all on the cogito argument, Descartes stresses, in this passage, what he is 
mostly concerned with (science), and calls our attention to the ‘danger’ 
(detrimental; nuisible) of metaphysics.
Moreover, more than generally agreed on, it is indeed taken for 
granted that in the mind-body distinction carried out in the Second 
meditation the main concern of Descartes is to prove that the mind is an 
immaterial, self-contained entity, which requires no material substrate 
to exist. In fact, the emphasis given throughout the Meditations to the 
cogito argument leads us to this seemingly obvious conclusion. But, in 
spite of all evidence, what Descartes really strives to demonstrate in 
the whole work is that the essence of  the body is the material exten-
sion and, consequently, that there is no soul intrinsically attached to it. 
In other words, Descartes had engaged in breaking with the scholastic 
doctrine of hylemorfism, since it was an obstacle to his project of es-
tablishing a new science that could be based only on the geometrical 
and mechanical properties of the nature. Arguably, the breaking with 
hylemorfism was the only way to legitimate, metaphysically, the foun-
dation of a mathematical physics.
connaissance de Dieu et de nôtre âme, je crois aussi qu’il serait trés nuisible d’ocuper 
souvent son entendement à les mediter, à cause de qu’il ne pourrait si bien vacquer 
aux fonctions de l’imagination et des sens; mais que le meilleur est de se contenter de 
retenir en sa mémoire et en sa créance les conclusions qu’on en a une fois tirées, puis 
employer le reste du temps qu’on a pour l´étude, aux pensées où l’entendement agit 
avec l’imagination et les sens”.
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That is why, after laying down the principles of his metaphysics, 
Descartes does not go on deepening and developing his new conception 
of the soul – the res cogitans – into a rational psychology; likewise, his 
proof of God’s existence is not driven to further considerations which 
would result in a theology. On the contrary, what we always find in Des-
cartes’s works after  the  presentation of his metaphysics is the turning 
of his attention to scientific issues. This very planning is displayed in the 
most important works of Descartes: the Discourse on Method, the Medita-
tions, and the Principles of Philosophy. According to Descartes himself, his 
metaphysics must be followed neither by a science of the soul (rational 
psychology) nor by a science of God (theology), but rather by a science 
of the body (res extensa), that is to say, a philosophy of nature or a phys-
ics. It is in light of these facts that we can assert that the metaphysics of 
Descartes is a ‘propaedeutic’ discipline for his mechanistic science.
Bearing all these discussions in mind, we can say that the con-
clusions drawn by the critic of Descartes’ philosophy who focuses his 
attention exclusively on the Cartesian metaphysics, particularly on the 
cogito argument, are quite shortcomings – but not false at all –, given 
that he would not be taking into account its most fundamental part, 
i.e., Descartes’ natural philosophy or science. Gaukroger puts forward 
persuasive reasons to explain why some critics have behaved this way 
towards Descartes’ philosophy:
[...] Descartes’ foundationalist metaphysics is so notoriously pro-
blematic that it is difficulty to get beyond it to what it is supposed 
to provide the foundation for, and, in any case, if the foundations 
are not viable, there would seem to be little to be gained in asking 
what plausible systematic connection there could be between 
them and what is built upon them” (gaukroger, 2002, p. 1).
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We are in agreement with Gaukroger’s claims. But we also believe that 
any serious attempt to assess a systematic philosophy, like Descartes’, 
should contemplate the whole body of works. This seems to be the 
most suitable approach to enable one to bring to light the meaning of 
Descartes’ philosophical intentions. Therefore, the great mistake of Des-
cartes’ critics is precisely to carry out a partial analysis of his philosophy. 
In what concerns the relationship between Descartes and Augustine, no 
fair and reasonable statement can be made by a scholar acting so.
Even though we cannot prove that Descartes happened to have 
direct contact with Augustine’s works, we must finally conclude that 
it seems to us undeniable that he incorporated some arguments and 
theses of the bishop of Hippo. Facing a sceptical environment, both of 
them found the weapons to fight this doctrine in the evidence of pure 
thought, which led them to employ the ‘method of introspection’: my 
external senses can always deceive me, but I can never be deceived in 
thinking that I exist. On this truth, the sceptic can cast no doubt. It is 
on the basis of this Augustinian argument that Descartes will create 
his famous cogito argument, the ‘Archimedean point’ of his philosophy. 
But what distinguishes Descartes’ purposes from those of Augustine is 
the fact that the French philosopher does not restrain his investigations 
within the boundaries of metaphysics. For him, metaphysics is just a 
first step in the direction of what really matters: natural philosophy 
or physics. In his view, it is not worth wasting one’s lifetime reflecting 
about metaphysical questions. Instead, after having reflected on them, it 
is just necessary to keep the metaphysical conclusions in mind and move 
on to the practical matters, that is to say, science. For these reasons, we 
have argued that Descartes’ philosophical project as a whole is quite dis-
tinct from that of Augustine and, except for what relates to metaphysics, 
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cannot be confused with the theological-philosophical project of the 
bishop of Hippo. In fact, we cannot find in Augustine a metaphysics 
sustaining a mechanistic system of sciences. That is the point.
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A METAFÍSICA DE AGOSTINHO E 
A FUNDAÇÃO DA CIÊNCIA CARTESIANA
resumo: O objetivo desse artigo é mostrar em que medida Descartes 
pode ser situado dentro da tradição metafísica agostiniana e em que 
medida ele afastou-se da mesma. Assim, demonstraremos que Descartes 
tomou emprestado da filosofia de Agostinho os principais argumentos 
de suas Meditações. Todavia, a despeito de todas as evidências factuais 
e textuais que serão fornecidas contra a originalidade das discussões 
metafísicas de Descartes, enfatizaremos, por outro lado, que os propósit-
os de Descartes ao tomar emprestado de Agostinho não somente o ar-
gumento do cogito, mas também algumas características gerais de sua 
filosofia visam estruturar uma metafísica que será o fundamento de sua 
física mecanicista. Tendo isso em mente, defenderemos que não se pode 
fazer nenhuma alegação contra a originalidade e o amplo alcance das 
intenções filosóficas de Descartes. Com efeito, ele pretende construir 
uma nova ciência sob uma metafísica, ainda que essa metafísica seja a de 
Agostinho. 
palavras-chave Descartes; Agostinho; Metafísica; Cogito; Ciência. 
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